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A framework is developed with what we call technology capital. A country is a measure of locations.
Absent policy constraints, a ﬁrm owning a unit of technology capital can produce the composite
output good using the unit of technology capital at as many locations as it chooses. But it can
operate only one operation at a given location, so the number of locations is what constrains the
number of units it operates using this unit of technology capital. If it has two units of technology
capital, it can operate twice as many operations at every location. In this paper, aggregation is
carried out and the aggregate production functions for the countries are derived. Our framework
interacts well with the national accounts in the same way as does the neoclassical growth model. It
also interacts well with the international accounts. There are constant returns to scale, and therefore
no monopoly rents. Yet there are gains to being economically integrated. In the framework, a
country’s openness is measured by the eﬀect of its policies on the productivity of foreign operations.
Our analysis indicates that there are large gains to this openness.
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There is general agreement that the gains to openness are large. There is empirical
support for this view,1 but the theoretical support is lacking. One avenue for gains from
openness is increased trade. However, the estimated gains from the increased trade resulting
from greater openness are smaller than what the empirical observations indicate. In this
paper we examine another avenue for gains from openness. With this avenue, openness
results in foreign know-how or technology capital being brought into a country and used
there by foreign multinationals. This avenue shows great promise of providing theoretical
underpinnings for large gains from openness.
We begin with a theoretical framework with plant production technologies and derive
the aggregate production function of a country. This aggregate production function has three
inputs and a composite output good. The ﬁrst two inputs are the usual, namely the services
of labor and tangible capital.2 The third input is technology capital. Absent technology
capital, the aggregate technology is the same as the one in the neoclassical growth model
that is so heavily used by macroeconomists. In our framework, the aggregate production
function of each country displays constant returns to scale. But, summing identical countries’
aggregate production sets results in a bigger aggregate production set. It is as if there were
increasing returns, when in fact there are none.
A unit of technology capital permits the ﬁrm owning this capital to set up one pro-
duction unit at as many of the locations as this ﬁrm chooses. This technology capital is
1See Sachs and Warner (1995) and Lucas (2007).
2In McGrattan and Prescott (2006b) addressing current account issues, we introduce two varieties of type
one capital, namely tangible and production-unit speciﬁc intangible capital. Diﬀerences in tax treatments
and reporting necessitated this feature. For the issues addressed in this paper, however, we need not and
do not make the distinction between tangible and intangible capital. The extension is straightforward, but
complicates the notation. All that needs to be done is to introduce an aggregator of tangible and ﬁrm-speciﬁc
intangible capital at the production level.
1what gives rise to foreign direct investment and to gains from being open and losses from
being closed. Technology capital does not result in increasing returns because a production
operation at a given location using this unit of technology capital has an optimal scale of
operation given the rental price of capital and the wage rate in the country of the location.
A country is totally open in our sense of the word if it treats foreign multinationals and
domestic ﬁrms the same.
As we want countries to diﬀer in size, a country is a measure of locations. As the
measure of locations and people are equal, we refer to the size of a country by this measure.
Labor services are country speciﬁc, not location speciﬁc, which means labor is mobile within
a country but not between countries. Bigger countries have more locations and people. A
country’s technology set is a convex cone, as is the sum of the technology sets of any subset
of countries. Thus, price taking is assumed and there are no monopoly rents.
Our abstraction focuses on the role of economic integration making possible the use
of foreign know-how or technology capital in production in a country and a country’s know-
how in other countries. We emphasize that this is not the only reason for gains from states
becoming economically integrated. The integration of economically sovereign states almost
surely leads to fewer barriers to eﬃcient production and higher productivities through com-
petition.3 But this is not the topic of this paper, which focuses on the gains associated with
exploiting both domestic technology capital and foreign technology capital in production.
In Section 2 we present some empirical evidence that becoming economically inte-
grated with the advanced industrial economies—in particular becoming open to foreign di-
rect investment—results in that country catching up to the industrial leader in terms of
GDP per worker. In Section 3 we develop the aggregation theory leading to our aggregate
3See, for example, Holmes and Schmitz (1995 and 2001) and Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2007).
2production functions. In Section 4 we develop formulas for the steady state. We use these
formulas to assess the importance of openness for development. In Section 5 we examine
the equilibrium adjustment path to the balanced growth path. We associate this with the
transition from a set of closed countries to a set of open countries. We also examine the
adjustment path for a closed economy becoming open relative to a set of already open coun-
tries. Here we are determining implications for countries joining a European Union type
organization. We limit international borrowing and lending. Without this constraint, the
convergence to the new balanced growth rate would be almost instantaneous, which is in-
consistent with the experiences of countries that became more open by joining the European
Union. In Section 6 we examine the adjustment path when countries diﬀer in terms of their
total factor productivity parameter and have this parameter adjust over time to the level
of the countries making the direct foreign investment as happened in the European Union.
Section 7 contains some concluding comments.
2. Some Motivation
The rich industrial countries are all open and economically integrated with the other
advanced industrial countries. One set of major advanced industrial countries is virtually all
the Western European countries plus a few small nearby countries economically integrated
with these countries. Another set is Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.
The last set are trade oriented Eastern Asian countries, namely Japan, Hong-Kong, South
Korea and Singapore. All these countries are open in the sense that multinationals can
locate in these countries with little fear of their operations being expropriated. All these
economies are exporting industrial goods and services and have a vested interest in staying
open.
Our measure of development is GDP per hour, which is what we mean when we say
3productivity. We use this measure rather than output per capita because our paper is about
the consequence of openness for productivity and not why incentives to work diﬀer so much
across the advanced industrial countries, and over time for the Western European countries.
In 1957 six countries signed the Treaty of Rome to form what became the European
Union. These six countries are Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and West
Germany. Figure 1 plots productivity of this set of countries, which we will call the EU-
6, relative to U.S. productivity. Productivity rose to the U.S. level for the EU-6 over the
subsequent 30 years.
Figure 1: EU-6 Labor Productivity as Percent of US (1900-2006)















The blip in the ratio in the late 1990s is almost surely the result of unmeasured U.S.
output being abnormally high in this period as found in McGrattan and Prescott (2006a).
The technology boom gave rise to exceptionally large expensed investments in starting of
new businesses, R&D, and developing new products and processes. This leads us to conclude
4the EU-6’s productivity was near 100 percent of U.S. productivity subsequent to 1990.
Figure 2 plots the productivity of the 1973-EU joiners, Denmark, Ireland, and the
United Kingdom. This group is dominated by the experience of the United Kingdom, as its
population is far larger than the populations of either Denmark or Ireland. What can be
seen is that the productivity of this set of countries fell dramatically relative to the EU-6
prior to joining the European Union and, with a lag, increased subsequent to joining.
Figure 2: 1973 Joiners’ Labor Productivity as Percent of EU-6 (1950-2006)









The relative productivity performance of the United Kingdom subsequent to joining is
almost surely higher than Figure 2 indicates. We say this because the EU-6 instituted policies
that screen out of the market a disproportionate numbers of low human capital people.
Bourl` es and Cette (2005) makes a human capital adjustment for France and estimates that
French 2002 productivity is 8 percent lower than U.S. productivity, and not 7 percent higher,
when corrections are made for workforce composition. This suggests that the productivities
5of the plotted countries subsequent to 1985 could well be 5 to 10 percent higher than the
plotted values.
Figure 3: 1995 Joiners’ Labor Productivity as Percent of EU-6 (1950-2006)









We turn now to the set of countries that joined the European Union in 1995, namely,
Austria, Finland, and Sweden. Figure 3 shows that these countries’ productivities lost ground
relative to the EU-6 prior to joining the European Union and gained ground subsequent to
joining. A Western European country that is not richly endowed with oil and that never
joined is Switzerland. Figure 4 shows that it, like the 1995 joiners, lost ground prior to 1995
but did not recover subsequent to 1995 as did the 1995 joiners.
What about those that entered in the 1980s? Greece, 15 years after joining in 1981,
began to catch up. Portugal did some catching up, but then faltered over the last 10 years.
The third country is Spain, a populous country by EU standards. Productivity measurement
is diﬃcult for Spain. It reformed its labor market policies and ﬂattened its tax rates in the late
6Figure 4: Switzerland’s Labor Productivity as Percent of EU-6 (1950-2006)







Figure 5: CE-8 Labor Productivity as Percent of EU-6 (1989-2006)













71990s. As a result its market hours per working age person increased by 30 percent between
1996 and 2006, which led to a reduction in the average human capital of its workforce.
As a result, the composition eﬀect is large. In addition to having new entrants into the
workforce there are huge on-the-job investments in human capital. See Imai and Keane
(2004), Parente and Prescott (2000), and Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998). This is part
of unmeasured output, and failure to include this factor would depress Spanish measured
productivity relative to the EU-6.
To summarize, a strong regularity is that new members of the EU caught up to
the industrial leader in terms of productivity. The deviations from this pattern, with the
exception of Portugal, could well be due to errors in measuring productivity.
We turn now to the 2004 joiners and, in particular, to the eight Central European
joiners. We call these the CE-8. Figure 5 plots their post 1989 performance. The plot shows
some impressive productivity catching up associated with becoming open to the EU. The
fact that EU membership fosters openness suggests that the CE-8 will be catching up to the
EU-6 in the coming years.
A region of the world that was not open in the last half of the 20th Century is South
America. In the 45 years between 1961 and 2006 its productivity fell from 35 percent of
the U.S. level to 26 percent as shown in Figure 6. This is to be contrasted with the Asian
countries whose productivity increased from 8.4 percent to 18 percent of the most advanced
industrial countries. This rate of increase has increased over the last decade. This is shown
in Figure 7. Openness in Asia increased in this period and Asia has become more integrated
with the advanced industrial countries.
8Figure 6: Labor Productivity of South America relative to US (1960-2006)
















Figure 7: Labor Productivity of Asia relative to US (1960-2006)
























i , where α ∈ (0,1) (1)




i , where φ ∈ (0,1) (2)
where yi is county i ﬁnal output.
The owner of this unit of technology capital “owns” the location production function
speciﬁed by (2) for every domestic location. A given unit of the aggregate input zi can be
used at one and only one location in country i.
This unit of technology capital can also be used to set up operations in a foreign






φ, where σi ∈ [0,1]. (3)
Our measure of openness of country i is σi. The degree of openness of a country aﬀects the
relative productivity of foreign operations within its borders. If σi = 1, country i is totally
open to the use of foreign technology capital within its borders. If σi = 0, country i is totally
closed to the use of foreign technology capital within its borders.
The country speciﬁc parameter Ai speciﬁes the number of units of labor services
provided per hour worked. It reﬂects diﬀerences in legal and regulatory environments. Thus,
10implies li = Aihi, where hi is hours.
A country’s aggregate production function
The set of countries is I = {1,2,...,I}, where I is used to denote both the set and
its cardinality. The measure of people is Ni and the measure of locations in country i is
AiNi > 0. A country i ﬁrm in our analysis is a stock mi of technology capital. The know-
how is embodied within the ﬁrm. If a ﬁrm operates in foreign countries it is a multinational.
Country i’s has technology capital stock Mi. It is the sum of the technology capital stocks
of all ﬁrms in country i.
The aggregate production function is the maximum output that can be produced
















The amount of the composite input used at each plant operated by a domestic ﬁrm
is z1, while the amount used at each plant operated by a foreign ﬁrm is z2. The resulting
country i production function upon substituting for Z is













where ωi = σ
1/(1−φ)
i .
An alternative and equivalent framework that leads to aggregate production functions
(5) is to think of ωi as the fraction of foreign technology capital that is permitted to be used
in country i. A generalization of this is to have ωij be the fraction of country j technology
11capital that can be used in country i. This generalization is straightforward and is needed
to deal with organizations such as the European Union.
We rewrite (5) as












as Li = AiHi. Functions Fi display constant returns to scale in the inputs {Ki,Hi,{Mj}I
j=1}.
If two countries are totally open and have the same productivity parameter Ai, the stock
of technology capital used in these countries is the world aggregate stock of technology
capital. In this case the stocks of technology capital used are the same, there is no economic
advantage or disadvantage in terms of living standards to being large.
The economy wide resource constraint is
(7) Yi = Ci + Xik + Xim + NXi
which states that GDP equals consumption plus investment in Ki plus investment in tech-
nology capital Mi plus net exports NXi. The laws of motion of the two capital stocks are
the usual ones:
Ki,t+1 = (1 − δk)Kit + Xikt (8)
Mi,t+1 = (1 − δm)Mit + Ximt (9)
where the depreciation rates are positive and less than one.
124. Steady State Analyses
In our steady state analyses we will assume that labor is supplied inelastically as the
elasticity of labor supply quantitatively does not matter for steady state comparisons. In





The function u is strictly increasing and strictly concave as well as being continuously dif-
ferentiable. When we deal with balanced growth, further restrictions will be imposed that
are suﬃcient for the existence of a balanced growth equilibrium. We deal with steady state
with each country i owning its Ki and Mi and with no international borrowing and lending.
The world steady state interest rate is ρ given preferences. The rental price of K is
therefore ρ + δk. Equating the marginal product of K to its rental prices yields the ﬁrst
steady state condition
(10) (ρ + δk)Ki = αφYi.
A second equilibrium condition is
(11) Li = AiNi = AiHi
as each person is assumed to have one unit of time and to supply it to the market.
An equilibrium relation that we use in subsequent analysis is the one obtained by
substituting equilibrium conditions (10) and (11) into the production function (6):














We turn now to developing a set of equilibrium conditions which the technology capital
stocks Mi must satisfy.











where θ = (α−1)φ/(1−αφ). This follows from diﬀerentiating country i production function
(6) with respect to Mi, then using (10) and (11) to eliminate Ki and Li, and ﬁnally using
(12) to eliminate the Yi that comes in when Ki is eliminated. The foreign return on country












This is determined in essentially the same way as (13).






where M = {M1,...,MI}. Equilibrium conditions for M, which do not depend upon the
other inputs, are:
(15) ri(M) ≤ ρ + δm
with equality if Mi > 0.
14Proposition 1. A non-zero steady state exists.
Proof. We develop a function f(M) whose ﬁxed points are steady state ˆ M. We use the
Kakutani ﬁxed point theorem to establish existence of a ﬁxed point.
We ﬁrst deﬁne the functions gi(M−i) to be the solution to (15) given M−i, which
denotes the I −1 dimensional vector of the Mj for j 6= i. The function gi(M−i) is decreasing,
and therefore
gi(M−i) ≤ gi(0).
The convex compact set over which the mapping f will be deﬁned is
∆ = {M ∈ R
I
+ : Mi ≤ gi(0) ∀ i}.
The function f : ∆ → ∆ is deﬁned as follows: function g1 is used to compute
f1(M) = g1(M−1). The vector (f1(M),M2,...,MI) and g2 are used to determine f2(M),
and so forth. This I−stage updating deﬁnes the function f.
The function f is continuous and maps convex compact set ∆ into itself. Therefore,
it has a ﬁxed point ˆ M. This ﬁxed point is not zero for the following reason. If components
M1 to MI−1 were all zero, then MI would be strictly positive. Thus, a non zero steady state
equilibrium exists.
An Algorithm to Compute a Candidate Steady State
Consider the system





i ∈ J ⊆ I (16)
Mi = 0 for i 6∈ J. (17)
This system can be solved uniquely for M = {Mi}i∈I. We will show this involves solving
two systems of linear equations. The algorithm is:
• Step 1. Solve the system with J = I. If M ≥ 0 a steady state vector of M has been
found. If not, go to step 2.
• Step 2. Remove the i from the set J for which Mi is most negative. Go to step 1.
With this algorithm, eventually a J will be found with solution M ≥ 0 as I is a ﬁnite set.
If the vector obtained satisﬁes (15), it is a steady state. For the examples considered,
the algorithm ﬁnds the unique steady state M vector. These examples have special structures
on the {ωi,AiNi} that ensures uniqueness.
Four Examples
We now carry out steady state analyses for four examples. The ﬁrst example considers
the advantage of size for a totally closed economy. The second example has two countries, a
big country and a small country with common levels of openness. This example is motivated
by Canada and the United States. The third example is designed to determine gains from
expanding the size of an economic union where upon joining a country adopts the same
openness policies as existing members. We determine gains to both the existing members
and new members. This example is motivated by a country joining the European Union.
The fourth example has a large set of closed economies. We show there are large gains to a
country unilaterally becoming open. This suggests openness is a contributing factor in the
16superior performance of the Chilean economy relative to other South American economies.
Table 1. Parameter Values
Production parameters α = .3, φ = .94
Depreciation rates δk = .054, δm = .08
Interest rate ρ = .04
The parameter values used are reported in Table 1. The parameters were selected
to match a labor income share of 66 percent; a capital to output ratio of 3; a real interest
rate of 4 percent; and a technology capital to output ratio of 0.5 for a large economic union
such as the European Union or the United States if it were totally closed to the rest of the
world and internally perfectly open. We picked a depreciation rate for technology capital
of δm = 0.08 which is lower than the Bureau of Economic Analysis estimate of 15 percent
for the depreciation rate of R&D. We choose a lower number since technology capital also
includes brand equity and organizational capital which depreciate more slowly.4
Example 1: Advantage of Size When Countries are Closed
We ﬁrst consider totally closed economies to focus on the advantage of country size
per se when ωi = 0. The per capita output is proportional to the size AN; that is
y ∝ (AN)
(1−φ)/[φ(1−α)].
The quantitative implication of being 10 times larger, as measured by AN results in steady
state output being 23.4 percent larger. This implies there are large gains to countries or
4Although there is little direct evidence on depreciation rates for these capital stocks, there is some
indirect evidence because we observe equity values.
17states forming an economic union that are open with respect to each other. We turn now to
varying the degree of openness.
Example 2: Gains from Increasing the Degree of Openness
This example assesses how productivity and welfare varies with openness for a two
country world. One country has a much larger population that the other. The large popu-
lation country might be thought of as the United States and the small population country
as Canada. Given that U.S. population is almost ten times that of Canada, we set N1 = 10
and N2 = 1. The parameters that matter for this comparison are α and φ in the production
functions (6). The openness measure is ω for both countries. Only the Ni diﬀer. We set
Ai = 1 for i = {1,2} as this is just a normalization.
The equilibrium M1 and M2 can be found from equilibrium condition (15). If the
solution to
(18) ρ + δm = ri(M) i = 1,2
is non negative, this solution is the equilibrium M vector. Otherwise, M2 = 0 and M1 is the
solution to
(19) ρ + δm = r1(M1,0).
We turn now to a comparison of productivities. Figure 8 plots productivities of the
two countries relative to the productivities of a totally closed Canada. Figure 9 plots the
stocks of technology capital. The gains from being large are sizable unless the countries
are nearly open. By moving from totally closed to perfectly open, Canadian productivity
18Figure 8: Steady State Productivities as a Function of ω























increases by 24.4 percent.
These gains are even bigger if we use measured productivity which we deﬁne as gross
domestic product (GDP) per person. Gross domestic product is output Yi less investment
in technology capital because the latter is, for the most part, intangible investments of
multinationals such as R&D and advertising which are not included in the national accounts.
As Figure 9 shows, the big country (United States) does all of the investment in M for
ω > .081. Thus, the measured productivity of the small country eventually exceeds that of
the big country. At ω = 1, the measured productivity of the big country is 96 percent of the
small country’s.
The measure of welfare that we use is consumption. For steady state consumptions
to be determined, asset ownership must be speciﬁed. We assume citizens of country i own
19Figure 9: Technology Capital as a Function of ω




























Ki and Mi and that there is no international borrowing and lending. An implication of this
is that the large country will have positive net foreign income and an equal size trade deﬁcit.
With this asset ownership aggregate consumptions are
C1 = Y1 − δmM1 − δkK1 + (1 − φ)Y2
ωM1
M2 + ωM1




C2 = Y2 − δmM2 − δkK2 − (1 − φ)Y2
ωM1
M2 + ωM1




Table 2 shows values of consumption per capita when ω = 0 and when ω approaches 1.
The gain for the big country is only 1.2 percent while the gain for the small country is 21.3
percent—similar in magnitude to the gain in productivity.
The argument for two countries generalizes to I countries. First order the countries
so that N1 > N2 > ··· > NI. The value i∗ must be found such that the solution to
20(22)
ri(M) = ρ + δm i ≤ i
∗
Mi = 0 i > i
∗
satisﬁes the equilibrium condition (15). They can be violated in two ways. The ﬁrst way is if
Mi < 0 for some i. In this case, a smaller i∗ is needed. The second way is if ri∗+1(M) > ρ+δm.
In this case, a larger i∗ is needed.
Table 2. Per Capita Consumption (with Y2 = 100 when ω = 0)
ω = 0 ω = 1
Country 1 98.4 99.6
Country 2 79.8 96.8
Example 3: Gains from Forming Larger Unions
We deﬁne a union of states as a set of states with common openness policy ω and
totally closed with respect to the rest of the world. Let the number of states be I. For these
examples all members have equal size AiNi.
Steady state per capita output as a function of the number of members is
y(I) ∝ (1 + (I − 1)ω)
(1−φ)/[φ(1−α)]
Using estimates from Table 1, the ratio of y(I) for ω = 1 and ω = 0 is I.091. Table 3 reports
relative per capita incomes for several values of I. As can be seen from Table 3, forming
a unit of 20 members increases their per capita income and consumption by 27 percent if
ω = 2/3.
21Table 3. Per Capita Output (with y=1 when I=1, ω=0)
I ω = 0 ω = 1/3 ω = 2/3 ω = 1
1 1 1 1 1
20 1 1.199 1.269 1.314
21 1 1.204 1.275 1.320
Suppose a country joins a union of size I = 20 thereby making the union size I = 21.
As can be seen from Table 3, this has a small eﬀect upon existing members, with balanced
growth per capita income increasing only 0.5 percent. But the increase of the joiner is large,
being 27.5 percent.
Example 4: Consequences of Opening Unilaterally
All states are totally closed (ωi = 0) and of equal size, which is normalized to AN = 1.
One state becomes totally open while the others remain totally closed to foreign technology
capital. There are I + 1 countries in the world. We use equations (10) and (11) and the
production function (6) to obtain
(23) Yc = ψM
(1−φ)/(1−αφ)
c
for a closed country c.
The country opening up exploits the world stock of technology capital IMc. We






22The important point is that unilaterally becoming open beneﬁts the country that becomes open.
In this case, if I = 100 the gains are 47 percent.
5. Adjustment Paths for Closed Economies Becoming Open
We turn now to the transition path of a country joining an economic union. For this
analysis, we relax several assumptions made earlier in our steady state analysis. Here, we
allow for elastically supplied labor and growth in population and technology. Utility ﬂow in
this case is given by
u(c,l) = logc + ϕlog(1 − l),
with ϕ = 2.5 so that hours of work are consistent with observations. The growth rate in
populations is γN = .01. The technology parameters evolve according to Ait = (1 + γA)t,
where γA is set so that the interest rate (= ρ) is 4 percent as before. Therefore, total output
in the economy grows at rate γY given by
γY = [(1 + γA)(1 + γN)]
(1−φα)/(φ−φα) − 1.
Along the transition paths, we constrain investments in both types of capital to be positive.
These constraints ensure that the stocks are also positive.
Example 5. Catching-up After Joining a Larger Open Economy
We reconsider the case with two countries of size N1 = 10 and N2 = 1. We ﬁx the
technology parameters Ai, i = 1,2, and set them equal to one across time and countries.
The large country is a union of countries or states that are open to each other but not to the
small country. In period 1, this country opens up to the small country. The small country
23starts out closed and gradually opens to the large country. Here, we have in mind that a
small European country joins the EU or countries like Canada and Mexico form a economic
union with the United States.
Figure 10: Openness parameters (σ), Example 5









The capital stocks in year 0 are the balanced growth values for σ1 = σ2 = 0, where
σi = ω
1−φ
i . Figure 10 plots the paths of the openness parameter for the two countries.
In year 1, the large country is eﬀectively open and the small country is eﬀectively closed.
The openness parameter is equal to σ1 = .99 which implies ω1 = .85. Subsequently, the
openness parameter for the big country stays ﬁxed near one, and the openness parameter
for the small country increases to that of the big country. This choice of paths is motivated
by the slow adjustments of GDP per hour following the formation of economic unions; the
slow adjustment in σ2 is due in part to political forces—that we treat exogenously here—
24preventing an immediate opening to foreign multinational activity.5
Figure 11: Consumption Relative to C2,0(1 + γY)t, Example 5








The paths of (aggregate) consumption relative to (1+γY)t times the small country’s
initial consumption level are shown in Figure 11.6 Initially, virtually all of the small country
gains are from returns on its technology being used in the big country. This is why the small
country increases its technology capital initially as shown in Figure 12.
As the small country’s openness parameter increases, so does the amount of foreign
technology used in the small country. The gains due to the increases in foreign technology
capital used leads to further consumption growth. It also leads to a fall in the small country’s
stock of technology capital beginning in year 17. In year 23 and subsequent years, no
investment in technology capital is made by the small country. When both countries are
5For the case that σ2 = σ1 in all periods of the transition, the results can be read oﬀ of our formulas in
the last section.
6The paths of per capita consumption are the same since both populations are proportional to (1+γN)t.
25eﬀectively open, their per-capita consumptions and labor inputs are equal but specialization
in production persists with only the large country investing in technology capital.
Figure 12: Technology Capital Relative to Y2,0(1 + γY)t, Example 5












The increase in the small country’s actual productivity, but not the measured pro-
ductivity, is similar in magnitude to the increase in its per-capita consumption. As Figure 12
makes clear, measured and actual productivity have very diﬀerent paths. The large initial
increases in the small country’s investment in technology capital implies that its measured
productivity is initially low relative to the period before opening up to foreign technologies.
For two years, the small country does no investment in nontechnology capital K while it
builds M. During this time, measured productivity is roughly half of its initial level. After
that, investment in technology capital slows but measured productivity does not recover to
its initial level until after year 21. Thus, during the ﬁrst two decades, it will seem as though
opening has an adverse eﬀect on the small country when in fact it has a very positive eﬀect.
26At the point that the small country’s technology capital starts to decline, there is rapid
growth in measured productivity; it takes ﬁve years to catch up to the big country. Eventu-
ally, the measured productivity surpasses that of the big country because true productivities
are the same but only the big country invests in technology capital. The example shows that
measured productivity can give a distorted picture of actual economic performance.
Example 6. Leading in Openness and Lagging in Multinational Activity
As our earlier example of a country unilaterally opening demonstrated, opening up
to other countries gives this country an advantage of using the world stock of technology.
We turn now to an example motivated by the European Union opening to the United States
and, subsequently, the United States opening to the European Union. The EU-6 countries in
the period following World War II had a population similar to that of the United States but
did little foreign direct investment in the United States relative to what the U.S. companies
did in Europe.
Here, we show what can happen when two big countries or unions of similar size open
at diﬀerent times. We set N1 = 10 and N2 = 10 and assume that the initial capital stocks
are equal for the two countries in year 0. The only diﬀerence between the countries is the
timing of opening. The assumed paths of the openness parameters are plotted in Figure 13.
Figure 14 shows how seemingly similar economies, such as the United States and the
European Union, can be very diﬀerent in terms of their multinational activity. The country
opening ﬁrst exploits the more closed economy by using its technology capital. For this
reason, it drops its investment in technology capital during the period when the relative σ’s
are most diﬀerent. Eventually, the country opening ﬁrst does increase its investments in
technology capital although the level of this investment is much lower than that done in the
27Figure 13: Openness Parameters (σ), Example 6









Figure 14: Technology Capital Relative to Y2,0(1 + γY)t, Example 6










If the countries were to open up further, the paths of technology capital would depend
on the relative sizes of parameter σ. When fully open, nothing in the theory pins down the
relative sizes of the technology capital stocks. Thus, it is possible for countries to have the
same standard of living but very diﬀerent levels of foreign direct investment.
6. Adjustment Path When TFP Rises
In the examples we have considered thus far, we have assumed that total factor
productivities are ﬁxed across time. One reason countries gain from opening up is that they
improve their productive eﬃciency. For example, there is a lot of evidence that Central
European countries gain in TFP as they open up. Their experience motivates our ﬁnal
example.
Example 7. Gaining from Foreign Know-How and Eﬃciency
We make a slight modiﬁcation to Example 5 by assuming that the country opening
also gains in economic eﬃciency as measured by A2,t/A1,t increasing over time, with the rate
of increase proportional to the rate of increase in σ2,t in Figure 10. When closed, the joining
country has A2 = .9A1. During the transition, we assume that A2,t/A1,t = .9 + .1σ2,t while
A1,t = (1 + γA)t.
In Figure 15 we plot the consumption paths for the small country joining the union.
As before we plot consumption relative to (1 + γY)tC2,0 and multiply by 100. We also plot
consumption for the case with A2,t/A1,t = 1. This is the same series plotted in Figure 11.
Here, the gains from higher TFP are similar in magnitude to the gains from opening,
29Figure 15: Consumption Relative to C2,0(1 + γY)t, Examples 5 and 7














implying an overall gain to the smaller country joining the union of about 45 percent when
compared to consumption levels for the countries when closed. This overall gain is far greater
than any documented gains from trade.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we provide theoretical support for the view that gains from openness
are large. The main avenue for gains in our theory is the foreign know-how brought into
a country and used by multinationals in production there. We refer to this know-how as
technology capital.
We see this paper as an extension of the neoclassical growth model. The extension
is the concept of location which permits the introduction of know-how or technology capital
without introducing nonconvexities. The theoretical structure matches well with the national
30accounts and the international accounts. In this paper, we use the theory to assess the gains
from openness, which we estimate to be large. In McGrattan and Prescott (2006b), we use
the theory to successfully address a puzzle in the U.S. current account and net asset position.
This extended theory leads us to view the world diﬀerently and some puzzling observations
from the perspective of theory without our extension are not puzzling.
31Appendix A: Data
Europe and U.S.
Labor productivity is deﬁned as total gross domestic product (GDP) per annual hour




where i denotes a country in the group considered. For example, I is EU-6. Hence, the
implicit assumption is that countries are weighted by their share of hours worked in total
hours of the group.
South America and Asia
Data for GDP per annual hour worked in South America and Asia is scarce, so we
measure productivity in these regions as GDP per person employed. This is calculated as:
P
i∈I GDP per person employedi · Populationi P
i∈I Populationi
Units
The total GDP and GDP per person employed for a given country is measured in
millions of US dollars (converted at Geary Khamis PPPs). Hence, labor productivity is
expressed in 1990 Geary Khamis dollars.
Data Sources
• Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992.
32• Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC), Total Economy Database. Go
to: http://www.ggdc.net/ then, Total Economy Database and download data. The
data used here are Total Economy Database, January 2007 (the database was last
updated in January).
– Data for Europe and the U.S. were downloaded on February 12, 2007.
– Data for South America and Asia were downloaded on March 21, 2007.
For all countries data prior to 1950 is from Maddison (1995). Table C-16a (page 249)
reports GDP in 1990 GK dollars and Table J-5 (pages 180-183) reports labor productivities
in 1990 GK dollars per hour.
For all countries, data for years 1950 - 2006 are from GGDC.
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